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Abstract
“Populism” as a political phenomenon has returned to public attention, but
its implications for public law, and in particular constitutional law, remain
poorly understood. This review-essay uses the monograph What is
Populism? by Jan-Werner Müller to examine the salience of populism as a
distinctive modality of political claim-making to U.S. constitutional law.
To that end, I contrast Müller’s definition of populism with alternative
accounts, and suggest reasons why constitutional scholars should employ
Müller’s. Leveraging that definition, I develop a series of tensions
between populism and the observed tenets of liberal constitutional
democracy under law in the United States.
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Introduction
As the twenty-first century staggers into adolescence, a specter haunts its liberal
democracies. The new century was famously supposed to mark an “end of history,”
insofar as liberal democracy would congeal, inexorably and glacier-like, its global,
hegemonic grasp.1 Instead, the new century has proved convulsive, angry, and pregnant
with fearful uncertainty—and this, despite the fact that it has not yet been punctuated by
the world wars that convulsed its precursor.
Why? The most obvious candidate cause is political violence. The new century
has been tragically striated by international terrorism, which took on new forms and
political salience in September 2001. But liberal democracies have faced intensive
terrorism threats from overseas since the early 1970s. 2 Policy responses—a mix of
surveillance, noncriminal detention, torture, and military force—have not changed in
kind (even if they have changed in intensity) since them. 3 The external security
environment for liberal democracies is thus not that different from thirty years ago, even
if old worries take new organizational forms. Hence, even if today’s specter may be
accelerated by public anxiety about terrorism,4 it cannot be removed to the fear of
political violence.
The specter instead emerges from within. For in the first decade of the twentyfirst century, a distinct form of political mobilization has simultaneously unexpectedly
emerged in several more-or-less entrenched democracies. This political form resonates
historically with earlier styles of popular claim-making in democracies. But it chimes
discordantly with the hegemonic liberal form democracy is assumed to now take. This
shock wave is global: In Washington, Warsaw, New Delhi, Moscow, Copenhagen,
Caracas, Buenos Aires, Budapest, and Ankara, a political movement, party, or leader has
seized the commanding heights by deploying political strategies or claims that can
loosely be denominated as “populist” (although that label is rarely embraced by those to
whom it is affixed). And even when populism falters at the polls, it scores destabilizing
policy victories, as the surprise outcome of the British referendum on European Union
membership demonstrates. In either case, populism as movement or governance
repudiates some or all of the values and institutional commitments underpinning liberal
democracy. Commitments that once seemed secure, unquestioned, and even hegemonic,
suddenly are publicly scorned and ridiculed as alien and unwelcome impostures.

1

FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN 211 (1991) (“[A]t the end of history,
there are no serious ideological competitors left to liberal democracy.”); see also Andreas Schedler, What is
Democratic Consolidation, 9 J. DEM. 91, 91-92 (1998) (describing democracy as “the only game in town”).
2
Gary LaFree & Laura Dugan, Introducing the Global Terrorism Database, 19 TERRORISM & POL.
VIOLENCE 181, 192 (2004).
3
For example, tactics such as waterboarding (which was highly controversial when used by the CIA), have
a history in postcolonial conflicts. Richard Brody, Godard’s Truthful Torture Scene, NEW YORKER, Mar. 6,
2013, http://www.newyorker.com/culture/richard-brody/godards-truthful-torture-scene.
4
See Aziz Z. Huq, Terrorism and Democratic Recession, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. – (forthcoming 2018).
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All this is tolerable obvious. But what exactly is “populism”? The question is
more perplexing than seems at first blush. To the extent populism is often characterized
as a “style,”5 it can seem elusive and subjective, something that exists only in the eye of
the beholder. Further, the term appears to encompass campaigning or governing in a way
that claims the authority of the people. But to the extent the term sweeps in political
movements or institutional arrangements that purport to vocalize “We the People” it
might cover almost any kind of democratic politics. This provides little analytic clarity,
and fails to capture the sense of novelty in recent developments. For example, in the
United States, conjuring the “people” in political rhetoric has never been the preserve or
one racial or social class. It rather evinces some “idealistic discontent that that did not
always obey demographic boundaries.”6 But movements identified as populist today
often isolate a single ethnic or racial group as “the people,” either implicitly or explicitly,
in a deeply exclusionary manner.
Nevertheless, it will not do to reject the concept out of hand. A set of
recognizably parallel political strategies has yielded striking political developments such
as Brexit, the 2016 U.S. election surprise, the near-victories of le Front National in
France (in 2017), and the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs in Austria (in 2016). All these
events happened within liberal constitutional democracies. It is thus hard to deny that
something distinctive is at work within contemporary democracy, something that should
engage students of constitutional democracy in particular.
These developments have seeded a proliferating debate in other domains. In the
political science context, there has long been a flourishing scholarship on populism,7
including its history and its relation to other deviations from a democratic benchmark.8
More recently, a related debate has bubbled up as to whether the world is in the midst of
a democratic “recession,”9 a claim often made on the basis of developments in political
regimes that are shaped currently by populism.
In contrast to the emerging debate among political scientists, legal scholars, and in
particular constitutional law scholars, are only beginning to grapple with the idea of
populism, and its implications for the range of normative ends typically pursued by
public lawyers. It would be regrettable indeed if constitutional scholars, whether focused
on the domestic American context or applying a comparative lens ignored the rise of
populism. The phenomenon presents a legion of new questions about the vitality,
5

Benjamin Arditi, Populism, or politics at the edges of democracy, 9 CONTEMP. POL. 17, 22 (2003)
[hereinafter “Arditi, Populism”]; KAZIN, supra note 6, at 5-6 (framing populism as a “mutable style of
political rhetoric””).
6
MICHAEL KAZIN, THE POPULIST PERSUASION: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 2 (1995).
7
Seminal work includes MARGARET CANOVAN, POPULISM (1981); GINO GERMANI, AUTHORITARIANISM,
FASCISM, AND NATIONAL POPULISM (1978); POPULISM: ITS MEANING AND NATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
(Gjita Ionescu & Ernest Gellner, eds. 1969); see also infra Part I.B (discussing more recent scholarship in
political science and political theory).
8
Sheri Berman, Populism is not Fascism: But it could be a Harbinger, 95 FOR. AFF. 39 (2016); see also
Federic Finchelstein, Returning Populism to History, 21 CONSTELLATIONS 467 (2014).
9
Compare JOSHUA KURLANTZICK, DEMOCRACY IN RETREAT 10-11 (2013) (arguing that democratic
practice has been faltering), with Steven Levitsky & Lucan Way, The Myth of Democratic Recession, 26 J.
DEM. 45 (2015) (arguing that this perceived trend away from democracy is illusory).
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feasibility, and future of what otherwise might have seemed fixtures in the constitutional
firmament—among them, the centrality of competitive elections to the constitutional
form, the (contested) ideal of the “rule of law,”10 the primacy of judicial review in
constitutional enforcement, and the force of individual rights. Populism calls all of these
seeming bedrock principles into question. The threat to the constitutional predicates of
liberal democracy from this new style of politics, may be either more or less grave. Some
elements of current constitutional dispositions may be exposed whereas others are
sheltered. But without a vocabulary for designating the basic dynamics of populism, and
thereby plotting its potential repercussions, legal scholars are bereft of basic, albeit
needful, analytic tools for estimating the threat’s magnitude and implications.
My aim here is to frame populism as an important new problem for public law
scholars in general, and American constitutional scholars in particular. Its focal point is a
monograph entitled What is Populism? by Jan-Werner Müller,11 a text that provides
perhaps the most resonant recent theoretical introduction to contemporary populism.
Müller sets forth a succinct and generalizable account of the basic internal logic of
populism as a strategy for both mobilizing public sentiment and also deploying the levers
of state power.12 He defines “populism” as a coherent political strategy based on what he calls
a “moralistic imagination of politics” as a Manichean confrontation between a morally purified
“people” and a corrupt and irremediable “elite” (pp. 19-20). As I explain below, Müller’s

approach conflicts with other scholarly definitional efforts in illuminating ways. Set in
the wider intellectual context, his monograph provides an effective fulcrum with which to
dissect the complex relationship between populism and liberal constitutionalism in its
American variant.
Building on Müller’s account of populism, I sketch three ways in which core
elements of that account raise fresh challenges and questions about American
constitutional law. First, it is worth asking whether populism as it manifests today is
consistent with the purpose and design of political representation via the institutions
fashioned in the Constitution. Second, populism calls into doubt norm of legality upon
which systemic constitutional stability rests. Third, populism as explained engenders
serious challenges to traditional understandings of whether and how individual
constitutional rights can be vindicated. To the extent one perceives a new efflorescence of
populism in national American politics—and there is ample evidence for this somewhat
on the left and increasingly on the right—the development presages an embarrassment of
novel analytic, prescriptive, and normative questions for American constitutional
scholars. For ordinary citizens who stand outside the scope of the populist project, the
prospect of populist rule bodes ill for stability, legality, and the preservation of rights
related to equality and democratic participation.
10

See JOSEPH A. RAZ, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND
MORALITY 211, 214 (1979) (distintinguishing “thin” and “thick” variants on the rule of law).
11
Professor of Politics, Princeton University.
12
Müller’s is not, however, the sole recent work on populism. See also JOHN JUDIS, THE POPULIST
EXPLOSION: HOW THE GREAT RECESSION TRANSFORMED AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN POLITICS (2016). CAS
MUDDE & CRISTÓBAL ROVIRA KALTWASSER, POPULISM: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION (2017). I draw on
both these insightful books in this review.
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A threshold caveat: Although President Donald Trumps inevitably looms large in
the recrudescence of American populism,13 this is not an essay aimed at evaluating
Trump qua president or politician. Indeed, to the extent feasible, I will keep some
distance from the particularities of Trump’s actions and political strategies. I do so not
because I think the latter unworthy of serious scholarly attention—far from it—but rather
because my ambition here is more abstract. I hope to provide a larger, generalizable
framework for thinking about the questions that populism, largely as viewed through
Müller’s analytic lens, presents for constitutional democracy. In any case, events on the
ground are moving speedily at the time of this writing, such that any attempt to make this
essay timely would rapidly be outpaced.
I begin by situating Müller’s analysis and reconstruction of a theoretically
coherent account of populism as a political form in the larger context of political-theory
work on democracy and populism. In particular, I contrast Müller’s definition with its
competitors in the political-science literature. In its second part, I deploy Müller’s
theorization of populism as a platform to identify three implications of his analysis for
U.S. constitutional law adumbrated above. This is an exercise in diagnosis, and the
question of how to remedy populism’s pathologies must await another occasion given the
limits of the essay form.
I.

The Difficulty of Discerning Populism

A.

Varieties of Populism

Talk of “populism” is hardly new. To the contrary, the term can be used to
capture a range of historical phenomena across a widely dispersed geographic range.
Mapping this range clarifies the challenge of identifying a workable definition of
populism, as opposed to “a map of the linguistic dispersion that has governed the uses of
the term ‘populism.’”14 The result, as Müller notes with worry at the opening of his
monograph, is that “we seem to lack coherent criteria for when political actors turn
populist” (p. 2).15
A history of populism, as that term has been employed in the scholarly literature,
might start with the middle European reaction at the beginning of the nineteenth century
to increasing commercial and social cosmopolitanism that stressed “spiritual superiority,”
ethnic identity, and cultural nationalism, one intellectual formation that finally matured
into an “existential politics of survival.16 In the United States at roughly the same time
period, it is possible to affix the label ‘populist’ to national movements such as Andrew
Jackson’s Democratic-Republican party in the 1820s and 1830s, the Know-Nothings of

13

This position is neither new nor controversial. Martin Eiemann, How Trump Fits into the History of
American Populism, 33 NEW PERSP. Q. 29 (2016).
14
ERNESTO LACLAU, ON POPULIST REASON 7 (2007).
15
Accord CANOVAN, supra note 7, at 3 (noting that the term populism “is exceptionally vague and refers in
different contexts to a bewildering variety of phenomena”).
16
PANKAJ MISHRA, AGE OF ANGER: A HISTORY OF THE PRESENT 169 (2017).
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the 1840s17 and the Populist Party of the 1880s.18 Even within a singular national context,
variation rather than continuity among so-called populists dominates. Hence, the KnowNothings are centrally identified by their ugly polemics and actions against Catholics,
East Asians, and immigrants of all stripes.19 The more agrarian and egalitarian Populist
movement demanded redistribution on the ground that “[w]ealth belongs to he who
creates it,”20 but (largely) lacked the bite and bile of their Know-Nothing precursors. Still,
they were a “grass-roots revolt against the elite or plutocrats.”21
A “modern form of populism” is arguably traceable to General Juan Domingo
Perón’s Argentina (1946-1955), with Mexican and Brazilian leaders quickly following
suit.22 In Western Europe, aversion of the actions of fascist governments before and
during World War II dampened the appeal of far-right parties, slowing the rise of
populism in most contexts.23 Political movements that have been labeled populist started
to emerge only in the 1970s and early 1980s, after a post-war albeit with “relatively
modest” electoral success at first.24 The French Front National, founded by Jean-Marie
Le Pen in 1972, for example received only 0.76 percent of votes cast in the 1974
election.25 (In contrast, Le Pen fille secured 33.5 percent of the national vote in 2017.26)
In North America, the Canadian Social Credit party had regional political success in the
post-war period, but never secured national success.27 In the United States too, populism
never evaporated entirely, and never entirely failed. Whereas George Wallace and Ross
Perot were unsuccessful as presidential candidates, it is quite plausible to discern
elements of populism both in midcentury anti-Communism and also in the racial politics
of the Nixon/Atwater campaign.28
Today, a wide range of candidates, parties, and movements can be
labeled populist in many corners of the world. In Europe, perhaps the most
populist parties are Fidesz in Hungary and the Law and Justice (“PiS”) party
Both came to power on the basis of election campaigns raging against
17

labeled as
successful
in Poland.
elites and

See W. D. OVERDYKE, THE KNOW-NOTHING PARTY IN THE SOUTH 20-45 (1950) (describing the origins,
and the spread of the “the Know-Nothings,” and their development into the American Party).
18
The leading work on this period is KAZIN, supra note 6;. Succinct account include ROBERT W. CHERNY,
POPULISM, PROGRESSIVISM, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF NEBRASKA POLITICS, 1885-1915, at 151-66
(1981); RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 131-34 (1955).
19
See, e.g., ROGER DANIELS, COMING TO AMERICA 265-84 (1990).
20
SEAN WILENTZ, THE POLITICIANS AND THE EGALITARIANS: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF AMERICAN
POLITICS 56 (2016) (citation omitted).
21
CANOVAN, supra note 7, at 58; see also KAZIN, supra note 6, at 30-42 (developing an intellectual
synthesis of populism).
22
Finchelstein, supra note 8, at 468; Bernard Crick, Populism, Politics, and Democracy, 12
DEMOCRATIZATION 625, 627 (2005) (tracing populism back to Napoleon Bonaparte).
23
JEAN-YVES CAMUS & NICHOLAS LEBOURG, FAR-RIGHT POLITICS IN EUROPE 53 (2017). I view fascism as
a distinctive and different political form from populism.
24
Cas Mudde, Three Decades of Radical Right Parties in Western Europe: So What?, 52 EUR. J. POL RES.
1, 14 (2013).
25
JUDIS, supra note 12, at 98.
26
Gregor Aisch et al., How France Voted, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/05/07/world/europe/france-election-results-maps.html?_r=0.
27
MUDDE & KALTWASSER, supra note 12, at 23-24.
28
Id. at 25; KAZIN, supra note 6, at 222-26 (tracing this development from Wallace to Nixon and Reagan).
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promising a fresh start for the disempowered or excluded. Both then implemented a wide
array of constitutional and legal changes that tamped dramatically down on political
competition. 29 Elsewhere in Europe, right-of-center parties have secured solid
parliamentary footing by cultivating a fear of Muslims an aversion to immigration, and an
appeal to patriotic memes.30 In the United Kingdom, a populist movement waved the
same anti-elite and anti-immigration flags to secure exit from the European Union.31
Unlike its Polish and Hungarian counterparts, which have effectively consolidated power
in ways that render electoral displacement unlikely, the British populist U.K.
Independence Party fell into a disarray after the Brexit vote, with “prominent defections
and vicious feuding,”32 and (for now) an electoral rout.
Finally, the U.S. Populism has never left the American political scene. Both the
Occupy and the Tea Party movements, for example, exemplify forms of populism, as did
the earlier campaigned designed to elicit the votes of so-called “Reagan Democrats.”33
Yet in the 2016 campaign, both Republican candidate Donald Trump and Democratic
candidate Bernie Sanders sought pubic support by “taking aim at the neoliberal agenda,”
and so both earned the sobriquet of populist.34 Further, 2016 marked the first time that a
populist candidate won the White House. Populism was no longer merely an electoral
strategy, but also a practice of national governance in the context of an extensive and
highly bureaucratized administrative state in which values of legality, regularity, and
technocratic competence loom large.
Nevertheless, it is important not to allow let evenhandedness get in the way of
clear analysis. On the Republican side, the 2016 campaign diverged from earlier
campaigns in other ways. It was the first time, for example, that any candidate, whether
Republican or Democrat, attacked a sitting federal judge’s integrity on the basis of his
national origin; refused to disclose tax documents showing his financial interests and
potential conflicts of interest; threatened to prosecute and imprison his opponent; and
explicitly refused to commit to accepting a loss at the polls.35 It was also the first time
campaign staff and supporters had harassed and threatened press perceived as hostile,
29

For Poland and Hungary see respectively, Joanna Fomina and Jacek Kucharczyk, Populism and Protest
in Poland, 27 J. DEM. 58 (2016); Miklós Bankuti, Gábor Halmai, and Kim Lane Scheppele, Hungary’s
Illiberal Turn: Disabling the Constitution, 23 J. DEM. 138 (2012).
30
See Farid Hafiz, Shifting borders: Islamophobia as common ground for building pan-European rightwing unity, 48 PATTERNS OF PREJUDICE 481, 481-82 (2014).
31
For analyses that emphasize the anti-elite and anti-immigration strands of the Brexit campaign, see
respectively, Craig Calhoun, Brexit is a Mutiny Against the Cosmopolitan Elite, 33 NEW PERSP. Q. 50
(2016), and Sara Hobolt, The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent, 23 J. EUR. PUB. POL. 1259
(2016).
32
Griff Witte, From Britain’s populist right, Brexit’s success comes with a poisoned pill, WASH POST, May
31, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/for-britains-populist-right-brexit-success-comeswith-a-poisoned-pill/2017/05/31/12b5c4c4-368a-11e7-ab03aa29f656f13e_story.html?utm_term=.8b84dea92060.
33
JUDIS, supra note 12, at 37, 55-61.
34
Id. at 63.
35
See Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt, Is Donald Trump a Threat to Our Democracy?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
16, 2016, at SR5, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/16/opinion/sunday/is-donald-trump-a-threat-todemocracy.html.
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sometimes with violent, sometimes anti-Semitic threats.36 Finally, it was the first time
that having prevailed at the polls, a candidate still threatened to denaturalize or imprison
those who protested his victory; complained of (non-existent) voter fraud; and exercised
an unusual amount of personalistic control over executive-branch positions that had
previously been thought to lie beyond the ken of partisan politics. Certainly, it is an open
question which of these innovations in political tactics flows from populism, and which is
distinct and separable. But at a minimum, such tactical innovations point toward the
possibility of a deep tension between populism and liberal democracy under law as it has
come to be understood in the United States.
Given this historical and geographic heterogeneity, it is hardly surprising that
standard examples of populism reflect a large diversity of institutional circumstances and
policy orientations. One of Müller’s useful preliminary contributions is a cataloging of all
the criteria that fail as common ground for the identification of populists, including a
singular socioeconomic basis or a common emotional appeal to popular “anger” or
“resentment” (pp. 12-19).
Of particular note, Müller observes that it is a mistake to suggest that populist
movements cannot govern, or that pursue their own policy agendas because they must
inevitably “rely[] on … a bureaucracy.”37 Certainly, there are some populist movements
that fizzle as soon as they grasp power. In addition to UKIP’s meltdown, in Taiwan
populism has proved fragile in office, with one such president lasting barely five months
in office.38 But Müller points out that “[p]opulists can govern, even if they engage in
“occupying the state, mass clientelism, and corruption” (p.102).
He might have added that it is equally possible for populists to build highly
successful political parties, which provide a social and organization basis for the exercise
of political power. Hungary’s Fidesz party is one example;39 Turkey’s AK party is
another.40 Populism, in short, can take a variety of more or less durable organizational
forms.41 And whereas Müller identifies the disappearance of “party democracy” as a
cause of populism (p.78), I think it is more accurate to say that populism bubbles up
when established party systems are in crisis and realignment—as was manifestly the case
in the French presidential election of 2016—but that populism can either work through a
new party or through a more charismatic mode lacking in any broad-based party
infrastructure.
36

Erik Wemple, Megyn Kelly’s Personal Horror Stories, WASH. POST, Nov, 13, 2016,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/megyn-kelly-divulges-her-own-private-horrors-of-donaldtrump/2016/11/11/01f2da30-a82f-11e6-8042-f4d111c862d1_story.html?utm_term=.27f348778af2
37
This claim is advanced in Eric A. Posner, Can it Happen Here? Donald Trump and the Paradox of
Populist Government 6 (Jan 3, 2017),
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/public_law_and_legal_theory/606/.
38
MUDDE & KALTWASSER, supra note 12, at 38-39.
39
See Zsolti Enyedi, Populist Polarization and Party System Institutionalization: The Role of Party Politics
in De-Democratization, 63 PROB. POST-COMMUNISM 210, 214 (2016).
40
S. Erdem Aytaç & Ziya Önis, Varities of Populism in a Changing Global Context, 47 COMP. POL. 41, 45
(2014).
41
Robert R. Barr, Populists, Outsiders and Anti-Establishment Politics, 15 PARTY POL. 29, 42 (2009) (“[I]t
would be best to de-link populism from any specific organizational form.”).
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This is hardly surprising on reflection: Populism (for now, still loosely defined)
has proved a durable and persistent feature of democratic practice around the world for
almost a century now. Several regimes that can be denominated populist, including the
Peronist regime in Argentine, the AK party in Turkey, Fidesz and the PiS either remained
in office for a protracted period, or appear to be well set-up now to do so. The historical
record thus belies any suggestion that populism as a strategy of governance is either
intrinsically self-defeating or self-limiting. Left liberals hoping that President Trump will
somehow self-immolate in a bonfire of his own vain making are, in short, dallying with
fantasy.
Two further forms of internal heterogeneity across examples of populism beyond
those enumerated by are worth underscoring. First, it is implicit in Müller’s analysis, but
worth drawing out more expressly that there are populisms of both the right and the left,
committed to very different bundles of public policies. In the U.S. context, for example, it
is conventional to contrast candidates Trump and Sanders as divergent forms of
populism.42 In Latin America, which has witnessed three distinct waves of populist
electoral success since the 1930s, the resulting governments have pursued both socialist
and neoliberal policy agenda.43
The potential for policy divergence even between closely aligning populist
regimes is most crisply evident in Eastern Europe. In Hungary, Müller observes that
Fidesz’s Victor Viktor has pursued “savage cuts” to the welfare state, while maintaining
its popularity by posing as “a strong leader ready to nationalize companies and use the
state to protect ordinary folk” (p. 59). The PiS, in contrast, “emphasizes the need to tackle
inequality and propagates strong welfare policies.”44 At the same time, differences in
social policy do not prevent convergence on what the creation of what Müller calls
“defective democracy,” in which changes to the electoral framework ensure that there is
little chance of an opposition victory at the polls (p. 58).
Second, Müller resists an explanation of populism that turns on fears of
globalization or modernization (p. 12).45 Populism, in his view, is not merely a political
or psychological symptom of an underlying material distress. The point might be both
resisted and extended. On the one hand, analysis of global income distribution trends
reveals that although the last three decades have witnessed the rise of a “global middle
class” in developing economic powerhouses such as India and China, it has also seen a
collapse in the share of incomes flowing to the working and middle class populations of

42

JUDIS, supra note 12, at 62-87.
MUDDE & KALTWASSER, supra note 12, at 28-32; see also Karen L. Remmer, The Rise of Leftist-Populist
Governance in Latin America: The Roots of Electoral Change, 45 COMP. POL SCI. 947, 949-52 (2012)
(documenting the third wave in detail).
44
Remi Adekoya, Xenophobic, authoritarian—and generous on welfare, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 25, 2016,
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/oct/25/poland-right-law-justice-party-europe.
45
Elsewhere, however, he rehearses a form of this argument attributable to Chantal Mouffe without clearly
rejecting it (pp.52-53).
43
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Europe and North America. 46 Some commentators have diagnosed populism as “a
solidaristic alternative to unbridled capitalism … sustained by a purely negative
definition of equality.”47 On this view, rising support for populism “reflect[s] divisions
between the winners and the losers from global markets, and thus whether lives are
economically secure or insecure.”48 This is a story with intuitive appeal, and no little
anecdotal support.49
But the picture turns out to be more complex. There is some evidence from the
European context that economic insecurity is positively correlated to support for right-ofcenter populism.50 At the same time, it is hard to credit economic insecurity as a complete
explanation for the success of populist parties. Populist parties have taken root in
countries such as Austria that are wealthy in both comparative and historical terms.51 In
Turkey, the AK party’s support base comprises working-class and petit bourgeoisie, who
embrace “its record of economic growth and relative stability after decades of
turbulence.”52
More generally, a recent study using data from the well-respected European
Social Survey found “mixed and inconsistent” evidence of economic motivations for
populism, but stronger support for “cultural values,” including “anti-immigrant attitudes,
mistrust of global governance, mistrust of national governance, support for authoritarian
values, and left-right ideological self-placement.”53 In the United States, an analysis of
Gallup survey data found only “mixed” evidence of economic distress as a predictor of
favoring Trump in the 2016 election, and stronger evidence that “living in racially
isolated communities with worse health outcomes, lower social mobility, less social
capital, greater reliance on social security income and less reliance on capital income,
predicts higher levels of Trump support.”54 Again, sociocultural factors—albeit ones
closely tied to economic considerations—explain recent populist successes at the polls
better than experiences of economic distress alone.
46

BRANKO MILANOVIC, GLOBAL INEQUALITY: A NEW APPROACH FOR THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 30-32
& fig. 1.3 (2016).
47
Pierre Rosanvillon, How to Create a Society of Equals, FOR. AFF., Dec. 14, 2015, at 16, 19,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-12-14/how-create-society-equals.
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To summarize, I have aimed in this section to draw out the internal heterogeneity
of the term “populist” as it has been used historically and with respect to different
geographical domains. Given that diversity, the question arises whether the term has a
cogent, useful core meaning or set of applications—a question that leads to the heart of
Müller’s analysis.
B.

Müller on Populism

The semantic promiscuity of the term “populism” has implications for any
definitional exercise. Populism’s specific articulations may well share only a
“Wittgensteinian family resemblance,”55 but maintaining the capacious colloquial sense
of populism might have consequences for analytic clarity. For example, constitutional
scholars might be concerned with the implications of stylistic choices between different
packages of political tactics and claims for the stability and integrity of the constitutional
system. If the adoption of a particular style of politics has downstream implications for
the achievement of needful public goods under a constitution56—say, the realization of
democratic voice, the remediation of abusive behavior using state power, or the
vindication of positive or negative rights—then constitutional scholars should search for
a definitional template that helps them isolate the relevant forms of political life.
Definitions, that is, flow not from a theory of natural kinds, but from the analytic and
normative ends of interest to the scholar.
It is in this context that Müller’s approach to populism is worth evaluating and
comparing to close competitors. In my view, Müller has surfaced a definition of populism
that is more demanding (and hence less capacious) than some alternative definitions, and
also more appropriate for constitutional scholars than other options. It provides a useful
starting point for legal analysis, even if it might not yield an appropriate frame for, say, a
sociological analysis of what is in the demotic labeled populism.
Müller defines populism as a “set of distinct claims [with] an inner logic” (p. 10)
pitched first in general terms, and then defined in terms of an enumeration of specific
traits. Pitched at this abstract level, populism is cast as “a particular moralistic
imagination of politics, a way of perceiving the political world that sets a morally pure
and fully unified people … against elites were are deemed corrupt on in some other way
morally inferior” (pp. 19-20). Populism hence is less a matter of policy preferences, and
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more a matter of the guiding assumptions about how democracy can and should work,
and how leaders can and should relate to the people.57
This general claim can be decomposed into two elements. First, a populist asserts
a “moralized antipluralism” predicated on the claim that “they, and they alone, represent
the people” (pp. 32). Any other electoral option or policy choice is illegitimate and
perhaps futile, in the sense that it will “amount to mere administration or cooptation into
existing political and social arrangements” (p. 69). By implication, there is always a
remainder that “can be dismissed as immoral and not properly a part of the people at all”
(p. 3). 58 This element of Müller’s account mirrors the notion of “ideological antisystemicness” developed by Giovanni Capoccia to describe a political party that opposes
some, but not necessarily all, qualities of a democratic system.59
Core cases of moralized antipluralism are easy enough to adumbrate. Müller
quotes Donald Trump’s campaign statement to that “the only important thing is the
unification of the people—because the other people don’t mean anything” (p. 22) as a
familiar, recent example. Trump’s threats to prosecute Hillary Clinton and to resist any
vote count that cut against him have the same flavor.
Outside such core examples, however, there are likely to be many peripheral
cases, which might or might count as moralized antipluralism depending on whether they
are understood to deny the legitimacy of opposing or alternative perspectives or values.
For example, consider when one national political party declares that a president who has
won in the electoral college is per se illegitimate, and must therefore be limited to one
term at any and all cost. This might be taken merely as a judgment about that president’s
policy choices and their likely consequences. Alternatively, it may well be more than a
merely consequentialist claim. It may also be a claim, however, that sounds in a moral
register and that repudiates the very possibility that the president might be recognized as
legitimate. In the latter form, such a declaration would presumably count as populism.
Müller might have said more to help sort through these close cases.
Second, the populist has a “noninstitutionalized notion of ‘the people’” (pp. 3132). This means that the populist asserts or assumes that there is a singular and morally
privileged understanding or will that has not been manifest through the formal structures
of democratic choice. Müller quotes Peron’s assertion that “the political leader does what
the people want” as an instance of such a claim of immanent and noninstittionalized
57
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popular will (p. 31). This claim impinges on democratic accountability. Whereas on the
ordinary understanding of democracy, the actions of a specific coalition or leader are
always amenable to critique as misleading or unlawful, it is never possible to launch a
parallel challenge against a populist leader. If once “‘the people’ have willed,” there is
“no action of a populist government [that] can be questioned” (p. 77). An implication of
this view—drawn out best in the political theorist Nadia Urbinati’s analysis of
populism—is that the back-and-forth of both electioneering and legislative debate are
rendered superfluous. 60 Urbinati, like Müller, discerns a necessary tension between
democracy and populism that other analysts reject or minimize.61
Once again, there are both core and peripheral instances of this logic. For
example, national security decisions in the American context are often framed as beyond
questioning in the courts, with dissenting voices receiving vituperative criticism. At what
point does the demand for absolute deference on national security policy, and the
dismissal of criticism amount to a form of populism? Again, Müller supplies the core, but
does not spell out how peripheral cases should be categorized.
In this regard, Müller’s analysis harkens back to a dynamic identified by the one
the leading theorists of populism of the late twentieth century, Margaret Canovan.
According to Canovan, populism fed on what she called the “Bagehot problem,” after the
leading theorist of the British constitution Walter Bagehot.62 Bagehot had celebrated the
British monarchy on the ground that it was intelligible to the mass of the citizenry. By
contrast, modern representative forms of democracy tend to be predicated on complex
institutional arrangements that seek to account for a plurality of interests and public
goods that might bear on governance. The result, Canovan noted, is often “a tangled
network that cannot make sense of most of the people it aims to endeavor.”63 Populism
takes advantages of the necessary complexity of representative democracy by offering a
more parsimonious, seemingly more candid, and often more emotionally authentic
alternative.
The Bagehot problem is surely one that bedevils our own system. Consider in this
regard the American system of a tripartite federal government, intertwined with a lattice
of checks and balanced, and perched precariously on a jostling array of sovereign states
with shared, overlapping regularity authority. Rather than clarity, the American system
blends, trims, and tuck-points a governing frame that makes little intuitive sense. It is
perhaps little wonder then that the history of American politics can be glossed as the ebb
and flow of various populist formations.
So defined, populism exploits, and amplifies, a series of basic dilemmas of
constitutional democracy. These dilemmas are both theoretical and practical. At a
conceptual level, democracy demands a definition of the relevant polity, but itself
supplies no criteria for the identification of its own boundaries (pp.80-82). As the
60
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political scientist Robert Goodin has demonstrated, though, taking an internal criterion
for democratic boundary-setting, such as the identification of all affected interests,
quickly leads to infeasible outcomes.64 At a moral level, democratic procedures (and in
particular legislative institutions) are justified by the fact of deep and abiding
disagreement within a polity.65 But, Müller contends, the empirical fact of pluralism, and
hence disagreement, has no necessary normative implication of recognition and respect
for pluralism (p. 82), at least without deriving an “ought” from an “is.” (Why live with
disagreement, when you can extirpate it? The question does not answer itself). Finally,
there is a practical problem of how democracies respond to endogenous movements that
aim, explicitly or implicitly, at dismantling the institutions struts of democratic choice.66
Under what circumstances, that is, is a democratic system warranted in taking antiliberal
steps in self-preservation?
C.

Alternative Definitions of Populism

The twofold definition advanced by Müller stands apart from other leading
definitions. Three alternative approaches merit discussion. Side-by-side of the various
available options points toward the superiority of Müller’s approach, at least for the
purpose od using populism as a distinct object of analysis in legal and constitutional
reflections.
To begin with, it is more demanding than other definitions of populism. John
Judis, for example, defines the latter in terms of “the conflictual relationship between” a
“people” and an “elite.”67 Judis’s definition allows him to study a range of political actors
who have in some way juxtaposed themselves against an extant power structure.
But so defined, populism is an immense category with little resolving power. At
its margins, Judis’s conceptualization seems to sweep in any and all parties that position
themselves in relation to incumbents. It is not hard to imagine that this might capture
virtually all insurgent political movements at some moment in time. To resist this
conclusion, one might observe that a consequence of Müller’s definitional approach is
that what some political scientists have called “agrarian populism” falls to the wayside.68
The American Populist Party, for example, offered acerbic critiques of capitalists and
industrialists, and indulged in what now is recognized as invidious invectives against
Asian and black labor69—but they are not well described as antipluralist. To his credit,
Müller recognizes as much (p. 88). To some, exclusion of what might have been thought
a core case may seem problematic. Alternatively, Müller’s antinominalism advances a
64
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theoretical agenda in ways that—as I explore below—may bring clarity to other questions
of constitutional law and design.
Second, Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser define populism as “a thincentered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous
and antagonistic camps, ‘the pure people’ versus the ‘corrupt elite,’ and which argues that
politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.”70
On the one hand, there are many parallels between this and Müller’s definition.
On the other hand, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser introduce a number of additional terms
and criteria beyond Müller, including “homogenous,” “antagonistic,” “pure,” and the
“general will.” The latter concept, which derives from Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s
theorization of the social contract, introduces new complications. Taken seriously, it
would cleave the Mudde-Rovira Kaltwasser definition from what Müller offers.
The reason for this is that Rousseau does not invoke the idea of a “general will”
without specifying its institutional setting to some degree. Although Rousseau assumed
that a well-order society would possess a general will, he also explicitly assumed that
voting would be required to elicit it, and, moreover, “carefully specified” the structure of
the voting procedure used to identify the general will. 71 Whereas invocation of
Rousseau’s concept of the general will thus implies that the choice of voting procedures
has a “moral significance,” Müller’s more abstemious definition stresses the way in
which populist claims to legitimacy supervene over and render irrelevant the technical
details of electoral systems and voting rules.
Moreover, Rousseau’s account of the role of the people in government is not
inconsistent with the idea would “discuss and oppose” measures initially proposed by the
government. 72 These elements of Rousseau’s account of the general will are not
obviously in harmony with the otherwise Manichean vision of politics that Mudde and
Rovira Kaltwasser spell out.73
In short, although Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser might be read to incorporate the
term “general will” without incorporating by reference the theoretical apparatus
developed in The Social Contract, I am not persuaded that their more reticulated
definition adds clarity rather than introducing new and unnecessary qualifications and
ambiguities. For this reason, I am inclined to think that Müller has offered the more
usefully and analytically tractable approach.
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Finally, Müller’s definition is in quite stark contrast with an account of populism
that emerges out of the post-Frankfurt School body of critical theory, and that is most
closely associated with the Argentinian theorist Ernesto Laclau. For Laclau, populism
arises from unsatisfied demands by marginalized and frustrated members of the polity,
demands articulated in a process of mobilization that terminates in a “a moment of
crystallization that constitutes the ‘people.’”74 Mao Tse Tung’s so-called “Long march” is
offered as an example—suggesting that Laclau’s notion of populism is rather different
from the traditional one.75 Ultimately, Laclau asserts that his concept of populism is
“synonymous with the political,” which in turn seems to exclude “sedimented social
forms which have blurred the traces of their original political institution.”76 The net result
is that populism comes to stand for all that is fluid, contingent, and subject to
contestation—a floating platform that can come to stand either for the vindication of
human rights (or totalitarianism), 77 but that seems necessary for the vindication of
popular sovereignty.
Unlike Müller, who categorically rejects the notion that population is necessary
for “reasserting popular sovereignty” (p.103), Laclau tenders an understanding of
populism hinged on process rather than discernable traits. That process, moreover, cannot
easily be discerned in real-world examples. As one (sympathetic) commentator notes,
“the task of determining when an ephemeral equivalence becomes a stable system of
signification” is not an easy or objective one.78 Moreover, Laclau’s account has more
than a trace of teleological, Marxian optimism about the spontaneous, organic eruption of
the oppressed. Indeed, his account is fairly read as a celebratory anticipation of the
coming self-actualization of the oppressed masses, and a warning against the pitiless
efforts by the ruling classes to capture and deflate this process. As such, Laclau’s account
rests on a controversial set of predictive and normative commitments—orthogonal to the
liberal, democratic commitments that animate much of American constitutional law—
such that its utility as a general framework for identifying and analyzing populism is
necessarily limited.
To recapitulate then, Müller’s is but one in a crowded field of competing
contemporary approaches to populism. In my view, his twofold definition focusing on
moralized antipluralism and a noninstitutionalized idea of the people usefully excludes
the large class of cases in which a movement has been categorized as populist simply
because its rhetorical strategy aligns it with the “people” (however that term is
understood): That is too blunt an analytic instrument. On the other hand, Müller evades
the theoretical entanglements with Rousseau’s account of the social contract and Marxian
critical theory that entangle other approaches.
74

LACLAU, supra note 14, at 72-77, 93.
Id. at 122. Further distancing his concept, Laclau draws on the work of French psychoanalyst Jacques
Lacan to articulate a series of seemingly paradoxical claims between popular demands and the “people.” Id.
at 118.
76
Id. at 154.
77
Id. at 171; id. at 191 (noting that populism can become trapped in the form of “petty demagogy”).
78
Benjamin Arditi, Populism is Hegemony is Politics? On Ernesto Laclau’s On Populist Reason, 17
CONSTELLATIONS 488, 495 (2010). It cannot help that Laclau is said to “think[] outside the parameters of a
Cartesian universe.” Id.
75

16
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2990478

This is not to say that Müller’s approach is divorced from theory. Rather, the idea
of populism mapped by Müller claims intellectual roots in the prewar work of the
German jurist Carl Schmitt (pp. 28-29).79 In The Concept of the Political, Schmitt (like
Laclau) offered a definition of what constitutes the political, albeit one that lacks for any
aspirational, Marxian overtones.80 For Schmitt, this lay in the “most extreme and intense
antagonism” between the friend and the enemy that arises “when one fighting collectivity
of people confronts a similar collectivity” within the polity.81 Dismissing the “empty and
trivial formality” of legislative debate, Schmitt went on to tantalizingly hold up
dictatorship as “just as little the definitive antithesis of democracy as democracy is of
dictatorship.”82 It is the Schmittian quality of populism—its contempt of the complex
mechanics of representation, its tendency to see absolute conflict between social group as
constitutive of the state, and its judgment that “political parties in general … pose a threat
to state sovereignty”83—that distinguishes it from other styles of political mobilization.
And it is what makes populism a distinctly worthwhile object of legal and constitutional
analysis.
Schmitt authored five books and more than 35 tracts in support of the Third
Reich.84 So it should not be surprising that the logic of populism shades into more sinister
“Caesarian” logics.85 Pursued far enough, that is, the dynamic of populism entails not just
the “moral[ization’ of] political conflict” (p. 42), it requires the triumph of the one, right
side, and the withering away of political pluralism.86 The logic of populism is thus
contiguous with (if not identical to) the defense offered by Giovanni Gentile of “the
Fascist state … [as] a people’s state, and, as such, the democratic state par excellence.”87
Here then, we have a normative reason for taking Müller’s definition of populism
as a touchstone for constitutional analysis. So defined, populism captures a style of
political claim-making, and a school of political mobilizations, that raise concerns about
the vitality and survival of democracy. In contrast to Laclau’s approach—which takes
populism as the realization par excellence of autocthonic and participatory politics—
Müller casts populism as democracy’s natural antagonist. It is this position that renders it
of especial interest to legal and constitutional scholars.
II.

Populism and the American Constitution
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The Constitution creates a set of institutional channels for national politics; it
recognizes, more or less explicitly, the existence of parallel state institutions more
decentralized politics. As the preamble makes clear, it does so with certain public goods
in mind.88 These goals are not self-defining, and in some instances partially overlap, and
at other times partially conflict. The “common defense” might be advanced in ways that
undermine the “Blessings of Liberty” for some, and both terms are surely contestable.
The political institutions created by the Constitution thus have a plurality of tasks. They
must decide how plural and partially incommensurable goals must be pursued, and
perhaps traded off, even as they resolve ambiguities in the definitions of the goals
themselves.
The capacity of institutions fashioned by the Constitution to juggle these tasks
depends on the style of politics of those elected to inhabit them. Some of the
Constitution’s drafters, including James Madison, assumed that the institutional location
of an official would determine his or her motives. 89 But it is widely recognized that
institutional loyalties are not as powerful as Madison had hoped, 90 although it is
premature to assume that they have no effect at all.91 Hence, the interaction of political
coalitions and styles on the one hand, with the Constitution’s institutional design will in
many instances determine whether the public goods purportedly furthered by the
Constitution are in fact realized. For example, it is now widely recognized that the degree
to which Congress superintends the executive branch (and hence realizes the public good
of democratic accountability) is a function of whether there is united or divided
government.92
Less familiar is the question whether political leadership in a populist vein,
whether in the White House or Congress, has implications for the Constitution’s ability to
realize public goods, or to channel and resolve disagreements as to which, and how
much, of such public goods should be realized. My aim in this Part is to frame a series of
questions about the interaction of constitutional design in the U.S. context, and populism,
the political style defined by Müller in terms of moralized antipluralism and a
noninstitutionalized idea of the people. This Part takes up three ways in which those
interactions may play out. My aim here, to be clear, is not to plumb the dynamic
interactions of the populist style and the constitutional design exhaustively, but rather to
gesture toward the kinds of questions and problems that might arise. The interactions
88
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mapped out here, moreover, are specific to the U.S. context. Pathways of constitutional
dissolution tend to be specific to a given design. Any analysis of the interaction of
political style and constitutional design, therefore, must be tethered to the local
circumstances of a given polity.
The question examined here—how populism (hereinafter, as defined by Müller)
and constitutional design interact in ways that influence the realization of valued public
goods—must be distinguished from a lexically proximate question of whether
constitutionalism should be “popular.” Müller notes as much (p. 61), but only fleetingly,
and it is useful to say why. Closely tied to the work of Larry Kramer and Mark Tushnet,
popular constitutionalism advances some idea that the people retain authority in the dayto-day administration of fundamental law.”93 There is no necessary connection between
popular constitutionalism so conceived, and the constitutional claims advanced by
populists. Further, there is no reason why a populist movement must recognize or
incorporate any form of popular constitutionalism.94 Instead, it is arguably implicit in the
logic of populism as defined by Müller that a leader channels a singular and prepolitical
understanding of what the people want. Broad public contestation over this vision may be
inconsistent with the populist style in many instances. In short, if there is a linkage
between popular constitutionalism and the constitutional views of populist movements it
is likely to be a negative, aversive one.
The question pursued here is also distinct from the (related) question of whether
the Constitution’s structuring of democratic politics makes it more or less likely that
populists in fact come to power at the national level. The latter question is most sensibly
asked in a comparative context, in which one can contrast the relative risks of presidential
and parliamentary systems. But I am concerned here as to whether populism once in
power, or at its gates, imposes pressures on the U.S. Constitution or its continued of in
terms of its abiding production of valuable systemic goods.
A.

Representative Democracy under the Constitution

Both the Constitution and populism are embedded in conceptions of how political
representation should work, and when it has become dysfunction. Perhaps surprisingly,
the original design of the Constitution and the implicit representational theory of
populism start from the same premise—the inimical relationship between a government
of the people on the one hand, and a diversity of political parties on the other hand.
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Common diagnosis, however, does not conduce to common cure. A gap emerges in the
solutions implied to the pathology of pluralism in the Constitution and populism.
I have already sketched populism’s aversion to a multiplicity of parties,95 what of
the Constitution’s? The latter’s designers had a negative view of the national political
parties that some of them would go on to create. They viewed national political parties as
“vehicles by which self-interested groups ... coordinated and pressed their efforts to seize
political power ... [and] pursue their own private self-interest at the expense of the
common good.”96 In Federalist 10, Madison condemned them as “a “disease” and a
“dangerous vice” that “tainted our public administration.”97 And in his Farewell address,
George Washington also cautioned against parties’ “baneful effects.”98 Parties emerged
(and indeed, coalesced around Madison, Jefferson, and Washington) because of the
candidates’ need to mobilize potential voters.99 In other words, the Constitution’s reliance
on elections—directly in the case of the House of Representatives, but only indirectly in
respect to the Senate—generated unraveling pressure on the design’s anti-pluralist
commitments.
Even if populism shares with the Constitution’s drafters an aversion to the
multiplicity of parties that we now associate with competitive democracies, it nonetheless
reaches a very different remedy for that shortfall. Madison, of course, resisted the allure
of an enforced homogeneity of opinion.100 In this regard, the Constitution maintains a
commitment to pluralism that populism denies. This commitment is restaged in the
document’s recognition of the independent authority of the sovereign states. In the
Framers’ original scheme, these supplied alternative centers of political authority that
could be mobilized were the central government to overreach.101
Moreover, the Framers further installed an elaborate apparatus of federal
representation, including tripartite reflection of the People in two Houses and the
presidency, staggered elections, and (prior to the Seventeenth Amendment) indirect
selection of the Senate. That finely calibrated and complex machinery would perform a
clarifying filtration of the vast array of public preferences, and thereby “refine and
enlarge the public views by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of
citizens, whose wisdom may discern the true interest of their country and whose
patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial
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considerations.”102 In the background to mechanism of democratic transfiguration is an
implicit, yet firmly held belief, that a natural aristocracy existed, ready to fill legislative
and executive leadership positions.103
Populism as a political strategy exploits both these solutions to the problem of
representation. First, as noted, the complexity of the filtration mechanism designed in
Philadelphia invites the Bagehot problem limned above.104 The legislative’s process’s
complexity, and in particular its proliferation of vetogates, invites at best deliberate and
careful policymaking, and at worst gridlock. 105 Second, the constitutional system’s
reliance on the assumption that a natural aristocracy would populate federal offices leaves
the system vulnerable not only to attack on the basis of its implicit elitism, but also
because it is open to the populist to assert that he or she is a constitutional aristocrat,
privileged with unique access to and understanding of the popular will.
The Constitution’s theory and institutional practice, in short, invite a populist
riposte. And they have received such a response repeatedly from the time of Andrew
Jackson onward.106 To be sure, this Achilles heel in the constitutional design has rarely
been successfully exploited at the level of White House—but it is quite plausible to
hypothesize that its persisting presence ensures the continuing availability of populism as
a viable political strategy at the national context.
B.

Legality and the Stability of the Constitutional System

Populist leaders and movements claim authority not on the basis of electoral
success, but on the basis of their unique and privileged access to the will of the people. A
correlative of this charismatic claim to legitimacy is that both the “empirical outcome of
elections” and the quality of policy consequences are no longer relevant criteria of
democratic judgment (p.52). The populist’s claims, as Müller nicely puts it, are “immune
to empirical refutation” (p. 102). In particular, evidence that populist movements are as
corrupt as the former elites they inveighed against and ousted has no effect on their
public standing (p.4, 47). As the sociologist Arlie Russell Hochschild puts it, populists
appeal not to voters’ material self-interest but to their “emotional self-interest.”107 By
presenting themselves as defenders of genuine national interests, populists are able to
deflected blame for material degradation in their constituents’ conditions (pp.58-59).
Indeed, to the extent that support for populist is correlated with the felt experience of
102
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limited life opportunities for self and family, populists’ failure to better the material
conditions of their constituents may well prolong the conditions that produced their
ascent in their first instance.
This stock of populist tactics for preserving power, Müller notes, has the tendency
to provoke “severe constitutional conflicts” (p. 67), often driven by presidential
initiatives. Indeed, populist executives in Venezuela, Bolivia, Hungary, and Poland have
all pressed (and in some instances achieved) constitutional or quasi-constitutional
changes that weaken coordinate branches or free-standing institutions of horizontal
accountability, such as ombudsmen.108 The modal forms of populist governance that
Müller identifies—stacking the bureaucracy with partisans, making patronage a
regulative principle of government largess, and using law to suppress dissent and
undermine civil society—all run up against constitutional constraints contained in a
relevant organic document, deepening the legal and institutional conflicts implicit in their
efforts to maintain power.109
Transposed to the American context, Müller’s model of populist governance,
however, has subtly different implications. On the one hand, the Constitution reflects a
commitment to an ideal of legality and the rule of law at a relatively abstract level.
Several clauses in the Constitution reflect textual commitments to ideals of legality,
formality in the exercise of governmental power, and an aversion to personalistic modes
of governance. The “Take care” clause, for example, seems to impose an obligation with
legalistic compliance on the president.110 As Justice Holmes once said,“[t]he duty of the
President to see that the laws be executed is a duty that does not go beyond the laws or
require him to achieve more than Congress sees fit to leave within his power.”111 The
Supremacy Clause and the Oath Clause of Article VI, analogously, impose direct
obligations of fealty to written law on both state and federal officials.112 The oath, Chief
Justice John Marshall famously underscored in Marbury v. Madison, “certainly applies in
an especial manner” to “conduct in [an] official character.”113
Beyond the textual commitment to legality that coruscates across the
Constitution’s surface, there is a deeper relation between legality and the U.S.
constitutional order. It is difficult to see how the processes of electoral choice, legislation
through bicameralism and presentment, and implementation through retail, discretionary
prosecutorial and regulatory decision-making happens without a high degree of
108
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internalization of the law. 114 Absent a shared commitment to the law, that is, the
constitutional system could not function in the manner the Constitution’s text suggests as
a going concern. In this regard, it is probably incorrect to distinguish constitutional rules
from the norms and conventions that surround them.115 Norms of legality on the one
hand, and constitutional rules are symbiotic, and not separable.
But move from the abstract and another picture emerges: Our Constitution is
conspicuously lacking in the practical instruments needful to making the abstract ideals
of legality, in the sense of limiting government action to the ex ante boundaries
established in written law, that other countries’ constitutions have. The U.S. Constitution,
for example, does not protect the civil service from polarizing cooption by a populist
president. To the contrary, the Take Care Clause has been persistently (if arguably
erroneously) read to vest the President with largely unfettered authority to terminate
officials, even when they are engaged in oversight of malfeasance of those close to the
Oval Office.116
Nor does the Constitution establish any independent bodies of “horizontal
accountability” within the federal government beyond the tripartite division of the
branches. 117 Notwithstanding Madison’s famous dictum in Federalist 51, the U.S.
Constitution is singularly wanting in “auxiliary precautions,”118 particularly ones that
remain effectual in moments of unified government and judicial sympathy with a
dominant regime. Rather, the Constitution depends on the exercise of sensible ex post
discretion by voters at the ballot box as the “the primary control on the government.”119
But if populist leaders are successful in appealing to voters’ emotional self-interest, and
thereby deflecting blame for deterioration in material condition, that “primary control”
will fail as a disciplining mechanism.120
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In sum, the Constitution’s combination of a high-minded but abstract commitment
to legality and the rule of law with a singular dearth of practical instruments for
maintaining those system-level properties regardless of the level of partisan heterogeneity
across the branches renders the Constitution perhaps uniquely vulnerable to some of
populism’s most corrosive effects. Rather than a wise institutional equilibrium, this might
be glossed instead as a design especially susceptible to the pathological tendencies that
emerge when populists strive to maintain power.
C.

The Challenge to Constitutional Rights

Populist governments impose stress on the individual interests protected in the
form of constitutional rights along two distinct margins. First, the installation of partisan
cronies in bureaucratic power and the reliance on patronage as a mechanism for
maintaining prestige and authority creates the risk that “only some of the people should
get to enjoy the full protection of the laws” (p. 46).
Although Müller does not develop this point, populism pushes even further than
mere unequal protection. If populism is characterized by a Manichean division of the
polity into the people and its enemies, and if reliance on charismatic and personalistic
means of maintaining power brings a disregard for the truth, then the populist leader will
be tempted strongly to take one step further: It is a logical consequence of populism to
identify groups (whether political, racial, ethnic, or class-based) as the enemy and to
attack them on the basis of false accusations. Policy failures may render it especially
likely, and especially alluring, to engage in the degradation of the other, with physical
violence following somewhat inexorably in the wake of rhetorical violence.
What follows might be described as a form of “discriminatory legalism” (p.46), in
which groups styled as the people’s enemy receive markedly harsher treatment.
Alternatively, a populist might try to govern by relying upon, or even creating, a series of
“small emergencies,” in which “problems that are deemed worthy of exceptional
solutions, but are simultaneously deemed too minor to warrant a full-fledged
reassessment of constitutional structures and constitutional aspirations.”121 It is not hard
to see how this can tip imperceptibly or suddenly into some form of atrocities, whether
large or small.
Second, the populist’s “moral[ization’ of] political conflict” (p. 42), creates a
pressure toward the dismantling of institutions that enable fair elections in which
populists’ opponents have a chance of winning. A wide range of tools, often facially
innocuous, allow for effectual electoral competition to be corroded from within. For
instance, Hugo Chavez’ government responded to the victory of opposition candidate
populists, as Müller notes, can “unleash terror against those deemed hors la loi” in short order (p. 61), it is
simply not the case that poor performance in any traditional sense will conduce to populists’ electoral
defeat. This is but one reason why it is inadequate to rely on political checks on exective power either in the
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Antonio Ledezma in the Caracas mayor’s election in 2008 by created a new “capital
district” and transferred most of the budget and authority of the mayors office to the new
entity controlled by the ruling party.122 When the latter lost 2015 elections to the National
Assembly, it again simply created a new legislature.123
Once again, there is an odd dissonance in the American Constitution. On the one
hand, the text of the Constitution is replete with individual rights, albeit framed at a
general and relatively abstract level. On the other hand, with the exception of the
Suspension Clause,124 the Constitution does not address the mechanisms through which
infringements on such rights would be prevented or remedied. Indeed, the availability of
remedial mechanisms has never certain or stable. Until the end of the nineteenth century,
the task of constitutional remediation fell largely on state courts, applying state-law forms
of action.125 The Court has allowed much of this common-law structure to be overtaken
by statutory remedial mechanisms available in the Administrative Procedure Act,126 or
has replaced it with federal common-law rules that are far less generous in their remedial
effect.127 If the coverage of constitutional remedies in the mine run of circumstances is
patchy, its application to instances in which the president invokes the national interest as
in peril is varnish thin.128 Hence, whatever rights might exist on the books, a populist is
likely to find that the clunky apparatus of judicial enforcement creates little effectual
checking power.
Conclusion
The foregoing analysis suggests that once in power, populists can work
considerable harm to the U.S. constitutional system. Their claims to legitimate authority
are parasitic on the complexity of representative government pursuant to the Framers’
carefully calibrated design. Their mode of governance imposes pressure on the
dispositions of legality and probity that are in practice necessary predicates for the
constitutional system to work. And they are likely to push the polity toward serial
violations of political rights and minority rights. It may then be true, as Müller carefully
explains, that populists are not ipso facto averse to constitutionalism, at least so long as it
inclines to their benefit (p. 61-62). But in the U.S. context, a populist mode of governance
places great strain on several structural elements of the extant constitutional order.
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The great advantage of Müller’s monograph is that it isolates and succinctly
captures the form of politics that generates these pressures. He further provides important
caution against assuming, cavalierly and incorrectly, that populists be tamed by having to
rely on entrenched bureaucracies in order to demonstrate policy successes, or that mere
constitutional rules will be alone to rein in populist capture of national high office. At its
core, though, Müller’s argument is a proper cautionary tale about political movements
that view themselves as having a monopoly on truth or right, and that govern without
respect and a measure of reverence for the institutional structures that furnish, and hence
render habitable, our democratic constitution.129 His monograph’s central virtue today is
that it makes legible the nature and extent of the populist challenge the project of
democratic constitutionalism that has been unfurling, hesitantly and sometimes in the
wrong direction, in the United States since 1789.
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